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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Supreme Court Case No. 32447, district court case number SP-OT-04-770D,
(hereinafter, 32447) and Supreme Court Case No. 34820, district court case number
H-03-279, (hereinafter, 34820) have been consolidated for appellate purposes.

In

34820, Max Cooke was convicted of second degree kidnapping, aggravated battery,
and assault, and appeals the judgment of conviction and his sentences for this offense.
In 32447, Mr. Cooke filed a post-conviction action arising from his judgment of
convict~onin 34820.
I

I
I

In 34820, Mr. Cooke has asserted infer alia, that the district court abused its

I

discretion in admitting prior bad acts evidence against Mr. Cooke in the form of prior

I

I

I
I

threats that he had allegedly made against Alison Cooke in the course of several
months prior to the alleged kidnapping, battery and assault. As a component of this
argument, Mr. Cooke has asserted that the district court lacked the necessary factual
basis from which to properly weigh the probativeness of these alleged statements
against the potential for unfair prejudice because the district court did not know how
many statements the State was seeking to introduce, who made these statements, and
what the specific contents of the statements were. (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-20.)
The State responded that there was no legal support for the contention that the
State was required to identify the number of statements it sought to admit, to whom the
statement was made, or the content of the statements in order for the district court to
properly engage in the analysis required under I.R.E. 404(b) and 403. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.13-14.) In response, Mr. Cooke noted that case law in Idaho established the

gate-keeping function that is required of the district court with regard to the admission of
I.R.E. 404(b) (hereinafter, 404(b)) prior bad acts evidence. He further cited to the
holdings of other jurisdictions that indicated that part of this function was to determine
the volume of the evidence presented and to ensure that the State did not "flood the
courtroom" with prior bad acts evidence. (Reply Brief, pp.8-10.)
Six months after Mr. Cooke filed his Appellant's Brief, the ldaho Supreme Court
in State v. Grisf, 2009 Opinion No. 14, held that prior bad acts evidence is only relevant
if a jury could reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the
actor. Grisf, -Idaho

,

P.3d -,

2009 WL 198963, *3 (2009). Several months

after the Opinion in Grist, this Court considered an issue very similar to the one raised in
Mr. Cooke's appeal in Sfafe v. Parmer, 2009 Opinion No. 15, and applied the holding
from Grisf to the defendant's assertions of a lack of sufficient factual basis to conduct a
proper analysis of the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence. farmer, - I d a h o ,

-P.3d -,

2009 WL 605804, *3 (2009). In farmer, this Court held that "a trial court

must articulate a separate finding that sufficient evidence exists to support a reasonable
conclusion that the act occurred." Id.
Given the substantial change in the state of ldaho law with regard to the analysis
required for admissibility of 404(b) evidence, and the direct impact of this new law on
Mr. Cooke's claims regarding the admission of prior bad acts evidence in this case,
Mr. Cooke moved this Court for supplementary briefing as to the impact of Grist and
Parmer on the underlying issues in this case.

(Motion For Leave To File A

Supplemental Brief And Statement In Support Thereof, filed on March 11, 2009.) This

Court granted Mr. Cooke's motion. (Order To Vacate Oral Argument And Allow Leave
To File Supplemental Briefing, entered on March 17, 2009.)
This Supplemental Appellant's Brief addresses the recent decisions in Grisf and
Parmer as they apply to the district court's failure to make the necessary factual findings
in order to determine the relevancy and admissibility of the prior bad acts evidence
admitted against Mr. Cooke. As a component of his argument, Mr. Cooke also asks this
Court to adopt either a clear and convincing evidence standard, or a preponderance of
the evidence standard, to the initial determination of whether the State has presented
sufficient proof to establish that the prior bad act occurred and the defendant was the
actor.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings are set forth in the
Appellant's Brief and are incorporated herein by reference

ISSUES
I.

Should this Court adopt either a clear and convincing evidence standard, or a
preponderance of the evidence standard, to the threshold determination of
whether a prior bad act has been proved by the State for purposes of Rule
404(b)?

2.

Under any standard of proof, was there sufficient evidence presented to support
the admissibility of the prior bad acts evidence introduced by the State at trial,
and did the district court make the requisite factual findings in support of the
admissibility of this evidence?

ARGUMENT

This Court Should Adopt Either A Clear And Convincina Evidence Standard, Or A
Preponderance Of The Evidence Standard, To The Threshold Determination Of
Whether A Prior Bad Act Has Been Proved By The State For Purposes Of Rule 404(b)
A.

Introduction
While the ldaho Supreme Court in Grisf, and the ldaho Court of Appeals in

Partner, did not directly address whether a clear or convincing standard, or a
preponderance of the evidence standard, applies to the district court's determination of
whether the prior bad act had been established by the State, Mr. Cooke respectfully
requests that this Court address this issue, as it will provide necessary guidance to the
district courts charged with making admissibility determinations pursuant to I.R.E.
404(b) and because this guidance may also be necessary for the district court on
remand in this case.
Because this Court has yet to speak on this issue, the holdings of other
jurisdictions are useful to the determination of the proper standard to be employed. And
a substantial number of jurisdictions employ either a clear and convincing evidence
standard, or a preponderance of the evidence standard, to the threshold determination
of whether a prior bad act has been proved by the State. While these standards have
been held not to be strictly required under I.R.E. 404(b), there are good reasons for this
Court to adopt at least a preponderance of the evidence standard. This standard is
consistent with that imposed on other fact-finding of the district court with regard to
issues of admissibility. Further, the modern trend appears to favor employing at least a
preponderance of the evidence standard. Finally, in light of the special dangers of prior

bad act evidence, a preponderance standard would act as a check against admission of
unreliable evidence that has the inherent tendency to prejudice a jury against a criminal
defendant,
B.

This Court Should Adopt Either A Clear And Convincinq Evidence Standard, Or
A Preponderance Of The Evidence Standard, To The Threshold Determination
Of Whether A Prior Bad Act Has Been Proved Bv The State For Purposes Of
Rule 404(bl
Twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with the

question of the minimum standard of proof of a prior bad act for Rule 404(b) purposes.
See Huddlesfon v. U.S., 485 U.S. 681 (1988). The Huddlesfon Court held that a district
court is not strictly required to employ a preponderance of the evidence standard to the
determination of whether the State has presented sufficient evidence of a prior bad act
under Rule 404(b).' Id. at 687. Instead, the Court held that the proper standard was
whether a jury could reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant
was the actor by a preponderance of the evidence. Id, at 689-690.
However, a substantial number of jurisdictions considering the issue in the
aftermath of Huddlesfon mandate that the trial court's finding that the misconduct
occurred be supported by at least a preponderance of the evidence standard. See,
e.g., U.S. v. Shoffner, 71 F.3d 1429, 1432 (8th Cir. 1995); Kinney v. People, 187 P.3d
548, 554 (Colo. 2008); Rugemer v. Rhea, 957 P.2d 184, 189-190 (Or. Ct. App. 1998);
Sfafe v. Fisher, 202 P.3d 937, 946 (Wash. 2009); Sfafe v. Willeff, -S.E.2d -,

'

2009

This Court may wish to note that the Huddlesfon Court's holding was a nonconstitutional construction of the federal rules of evidence, and therefore constitutes
mere persuasive precedent for this Court. See Sfafe v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196
(Ariz. 1997).

WL 230694, *4 (W.Va. 2009). Other jurisdictions have required even stronger proof that the State's allegations of prior bad acts be established by clear and convincing
evidence

- as a prerequisite to admissibility under Rule 404(b).

See, e.g., Stafe v.

Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, I196 (Ariz. 1997); Getz v. Stafe, 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del.
1988); State v. Brooks, 541 So.2d 801, 814 (La. 1989) (citing, interalia, Sfafe v. Moore,
440 So.2d 134, 137 (La. 1983)); Stafe v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 260-261 (Minn. 2008);
State

V.

Alvarado, 757 N.W.2d 570, 577 (N.D. 2008); Sfafe v. Stokes, 673 S.E.2d 434,

441 (S.C. 2009); Sfafe v. McCaly, 922 S.W.2d 511,514 (Tenn. 1996). And at least one
jurisdiction requires that prior bad acts evidence be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
as a prerequisite to their admissibility. Harrell v. Sfate, 884 S.W.2d 154, 158-159 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994).
ldaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) does not explicitly provide guidance on the proper
evidentiary standard for proof of prior bad acts. See I.R.E. 404(b). In light of this,
guidance from other areas of ldaho case law is appropriate. See Sfate v. McGinnis,
455 S.E.2d 516, 526 (W.Va. 1994). The preponderance standard is consistently
applied in ldaho to other preliminary factual determinations made by the district court
with regard to the admissibility of evidence. See, e.g., Sfafe v. Culbertson, 105 ldaho
128, 130, 666 P.2d 1139, 1141 (1983) (facts in a suppression hearing are to be
determined by a preponderance of the evidence); Sfafe v. Mitchell, 104 ldaho 493, 495
n.1, 660 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1983) (noting that finding of voluntariness of defendant's
waiver of Miranda rights prior to finding of admissibility of defendant's statements is
governed by preponderance of evidence standard); State v. Gibson, 141 ldaho 277,287
n.4, 108 P.3d 424, 433 (Ct. App. 2005) (applying preponderance of the evidence

standard to facts presented in support of inevitable discovery doctrine); State v.
Byington, 132 ldaho 597, 600-601, 977 P.2d 211, 214-215 (Ct. App. 1998) (applying
preponderance of the evidence standard to defendant's challenge to a search warrant);
State

V.

Abeyta, 131 ldaho 704, 708, 963 P.2d 387, 391 (Ct. App. 1998) (in order to

prove consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State must establish by
preponderance of the evidence that defendant voluntarily consented to a warrantless
search in order for evidence of that search to be admissible). To apply a lower
evidentiary standard to the initial fact-finding required for admissibility of prior bad acts
evidence would be anomalous to the standard of evidence consistently applied to other
admissibility determinations.
Additionally, there are strong policy reasons for this Court to adopt either a clear
and convincing evidence standard, or a preponderance of the evidence standard, to the
initial factual determination that the prior bad act occurred and that the defendant
committed it. This Court has long recognized the special danger posed by prior bad
acts evidence. "Evidence of prior bad acts may pose a danger that the jury will find the
defendant guilty because he is a bad person rather than because he is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged." State v. Buzzard, 110 Idaho 800, 802, 718 P.2d
1238, 1240 (Ct. App. 1986). This is precisely the reason why many other jurisdictions
apply at least a preponderance of the evidence standard to the determination of
whether the prior bad act that the State seeks to introduce has been proven. See, e.g.,
Terrazas, 944 P.2d at 1198; Rugemer, 957 P.2d at 189-190; McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d at
527. As noted by the West Virginia Supreme Court, "To expose the jury to Rule 404(b)
evidence before the trial court has determined by a preponderance of the evidence that

the acts were committed and that the defendant committed them would in our view
subject the defendant to an unfair risk of conviction regardless of the jury's ultimate
determination of these facts." h/lcGinnis,455 S.E.2d at 527.
Because there is a heightened danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant that
inheres in the introduction of prior bad acts evidence, a showing of at least the
probability that the alleged bad acts occurred and were committed by the defendant is
necessary to prevent the erroneous admission of unfounded accusations that are
unrelated to the charged offense. As such, Mr. Cooke respectfully requests that this
Court clarify that the standard of proof attendant on the threshold determination of
whether the alleged prior bad acts have been established is either clear and convincing
evidence or a preponderance of the evidence.
II.

Under Any Standard Of Proof, Was There Sufficient Evidence Presented To Support
The Admissibility Of The Prior Bad Acts Evidence Introduced By The State At Trial. And
Did The District Court Make The Reauisite Factual Findings In Support Of The
Admissibility Of This Evidence
A.

Introduction
The district court in this case lacked a sufficient factual basis to determine that

the prior bad acts that the State was seeking to admit pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) against
Mr. Cooke occurred and that Mr. Cooke was the individual who committed them. Not
only was the proof presented by the State insufficient to establish these bad acts, but
the district court failed to make the requisite finding regarding the sufficiency of the
State's proof. Additionally, the district court, by its own admission, was unaware of the
volume of the evidence that the State was seeking to present, and also had not been

presented with the substance of these statements. As such, the district court was
unable to properly weigh probativeness against the potential for undue prejudice of
these statements and fulfill its proper gate-keeping function pursuant to I.R.E. 403
B.

Under Any Standard Of Proof, There Was Not Sufficient Evidence Presented To
Support The Admissibilitv Of The Prior Bad Acts Evidence Introduced BV The
State At Trial, And The District Court Failed To Make The Requisite Factual
Findinns In Support Of The Admissibilitv Of This Evidence
This Court reviews relevance determinations de novo.

See, e.g., Sfafe v.

Karpach, 146 ldaho 736, 739, 202 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Ct. App. 2009). The ldaho
Supreme Court in Grist has recently clarified that prior bad acts evidence admitted
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) "is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude[2] that the
act occurred and the defendant was the actor."

Grist, 2009 WL 198963 at *3.

Therefore, in order for a district court's ruling admitting prior bad acts evidence to be
admitted to be sustained, the district court must have made a determination, "that there
is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the act occurred and that
the defendant was the actor." Parmer, 2009 WL 605804 at *3.
In doing so, the district court may rely on the offer of proof tendered by the State.

Id. However, "a trial court must articulate a separate finding that sufficient evidence
exists to support a reasonable conclusion that the act occurred." Id.
In this case, the proffer made by the State was insufficient to meet any
evidentiary standard with regard to the proof of prior bad acts evidence. And, by the
district court's own admission, it had no idea what evidence exactly the court was

It is unclear whether the Court in Grist intended the requirement of evidence sufficient
to support a reasonable conclusion on the part of the jury to be roughly the equivalent of
a preponderance of the evidence standard.

allowing to come before the jury, and therefore the court could not have made a finding
that sufficient evidence was presented in support of this unknown evidence.
In the State's Brief In Support of Idaho Rule 404(b) Evidence, the State asserted
that it's "evidence would show that the defendant made several threats to Alison Cooke
in the approximately six weeks prior to the crash." (34820 Tr., p.14.) The State then
continued:
The defendant was suspicious that his wife was calling or seeing another
man. The threats made to Alison were that he would kill her if he found
out that she was talking to another man or seeing another man. The
defendant not only made these threats directly to Alison Cooke, but he
also told other people that he would kill Alison if he found out that she was
speaking to another man. He also threatened to kill himself.
(34820 R., p.14.)
Nothing in the State's brief or argument on the motion indicates how many
witnesses, how many statements, or the specific contents of the alleged statements
made by Mr. Cooke it was seeking to introduce.

(34820 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-3; 34820

R., p.14.) The State appears to have limited its initial briefing in support of the admission
of prior bad acts specifically to death threats allegedly made against Ms. Cooke by
Mr. Cooke. (34820 R., p.18.) At the hearing on the 404(b) motion, the State asserted
that Mr. Cooke made threats to, "a couple of her friends and a couple of her relatives,
her brother and sister." (34820 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-3.) According to the State, it intended on
presenting the evidence in order to show intent, as well as absence of mistake. (34820
Tr., p.8, Ls.20-24.)
Unlike the notice provided in Parmer, the State never identified by name the
individuals that it was intending to call to present these prior threats, the number of
individuals or threats that it was seeking to introduce, or the substantive content of the

threats that were actually presented at trial. Parmer, 2009 WL 605804, *4. (34820
Tr., p.6, L.16

- p.9, L.14.)

Also in contrast with the district court in Parmer, the district

court in this case never made any factual findings that the statements were established
by a sufficient quantum proof in holding that the alleged prior threats made by
Mr. Cooke towards Ms. Cooke were admissible. Id. (34820 Tr., p.12, L.12 - p.13, L.8.)
The district court merely held that any threats made to Ms. Cooke were relevant as to
intent, and the prejudicial effect did not outweigh the probative value. (34820 Tr., p.12,
L.12 - p 13, L.8.)
Particularly telling in the district court's holding is its acknowledgement that the
court didn't know how many statements the State was seeking to admit.

(34820

Tr., p.13, Ls.3-5.) Additionally, as previously noted, the evidence presented by the
State did not identify how many witnesses would be introduced at trial or the substantive
content of the statements themselves. As such, the district court did not make any
express or implied factual findings regarding whether admission of the prior bad acts
evidence by the State was supported by a sufficient quantum of proof. Under any
evidentiary standard, the district court improperly determined that these unidentified
statements of an unknown quantity were relevant without first determining whether the
State had presented sufficient proof in support of their admission. See Grist, 2009 WL
198963, "3.
In addition, this Court in Parmer, relying on the Opinion in G~l'st,also made clear
that findings with regard to the number of witnesses testifying to prior bad acts, and the
volume of such evidence presented, is essential in order to properly weigh the danger of

unfair prejudice against the probative value of such evidence under I.R.E. 403. Parmer,
2009 WL 605804, * I I.According to this Court:
The question of the number of witnesses testifying to prior bad acts is a
matter of concern under Rule 403 analysis. Since the testimony is
inherently prejudicial, at some point the number of such witnesses can
become excessive and overwhelm the probative value of the evidence.
This determination is left to the discretion of the trial court.

Id.
Mr. Cooke has previously asserted to this Court that the district court lacked the
essential factual basis in order to adequately conduct a proper weighing pursuant to
I.R.E. 403, and further could not perform the gate-keeping function that is part of the
responsibility of the courts in determining what prior bad acts evidence to admit at trial.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.17-20, Reply Brief, pp.8-10.) While he has previously relied
largely on persuasive precedent in support of his contentions, he asks that this Court
consider the relevant language in Parmer regarding the duty of the district court to
adequately consider the volume of the evidence to be presented as part of its analysis
pursuant to I.R.E. 403. The volume of the evidence to be presented has material
bearing on the overall determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is
outweighed by the potential for prejudice. Here, the district court by its own admission
did not know the scope and volume of this evidence prior to determining its admissibility
under I.R.E. 403. In light of this, Mr. Cooke asserts that the district court abused its
discretion when it determined that the probative value of the prior bad act evidence
sought to be admitted by the State was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Cooke respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and sentence and remand his case for a new trial. Alternatively, he asks that this Court
vacate the district court's order denying him post-conviction relief.
DATED this 21'' day of April, 2009.
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